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THE CHINESE BANKS IN MALFORMED I 
TRANSITION· 
WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THEIR MOVE-
MENT IN THE EARLY"PERIOD OF THE. 
REPUBLICAN" REGIME 
By KIYOYUKI TOKUNAGA 
1. RESTRICTED EXIT 
The. forerunners of the foreign-style banks in China may 
be classified into those established by foreign countries and· 
those of native creation. The first of the former is the 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China "established in 
1857,. while that of the latter is the Commercial Bank of 
: China ('p;H1!ijl)j~ITJ established in 1896. Thus, there is an 
intervening. period of forty. years between the two . sets of . 
foreign·style banks, thereby indIcating the faCt that" at least 
. in formality the banks of foreign nationalities led the Chinese. 
Concretely,this is shown by the fact that when theCommer-
cial Bank of China was established, its by-laws were modeled. 
after those of "the Hongkong and Shanghai. Banking Corpo-
ration.· One motive for theesfablishment Qf Chinese fereign-
style banks was to develop China's foreign trade in compe-
tition with the foreign banks In China. The latter banks 
offered an opportunity for creating Chinese foreign-style 
banks. 
It appears that the Chinese banks· made rather a late 
start and their establishment followed an urgent demand" 
that something should be done in order to meet "th~ compe" 
titionof foreign ba"nks in China. However, the backwardness 
of the Chinese banks is due" the special circumstances which 
"were confronted by China and which retarded their develop· 
/ 
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the Chinese industrial life and the early start madeby foreign 
banks in the Qhinesefinancialworld, both of which formed 
the peculiar chciracter of China's period of transition from 
.. her modern to' present·day period. 
Real circumstances in China's industrial and financial 
phases failed to positively stimulate the development of 
Chinese foreign·style 'banks which had to travel not the 
smooth highway of growth but the rough and tUl)lbling road 
.of abnormality .and lIlalformed character. 
2. RECKLESS ESTABLISHMENT OF BANKS 
Prior to the advent of the republican regime, there 'was 
- one central bank' called The ,Ta Ching Government Bank 
(7dj!j-~n), its forerunner being the Hupu Bank (pffll;iNnJ, 
which was established. in 1908. In 1907, the Bank of 
Corrimunicati~ns (xlifl&N1l') came into. being. Besides these 
- . .-, I , . 
two 'government banks, the following ,representative foreign' 
, . 
style banks were created:. the national Commercial Bank,' 
Ltd. (#JiW~;i\'i~n), . in 1906; the' Ningpo Commercial' and' 
Savings Bank, Ltd. (1rnIlJl~;i\'i1,ilIta&lm), in 1908; the Chekiang 
Bank, Ltd. (#JiiI&Rft), in ,1908, which was the forerunner of 
the Chekiang Industrial Bank, Ltd. (#JiiJ:.;i\'i~l'rJ; the 
commercial Guarantee Bank of Chihli (~t1'M~f\!j;iNil') in 1909. 
Thus,' even towards the close of the Ching Dynasty, the· 
number of foreign·style banks had shown a.steady increase 
which was .stimulated further after the advent of - the re-
publiqm regime. , 
After the establishment of the Republic, the Ta Ching 
Government Bank was replaced by the Bank of China (cf1 i1 
iiN1l'). The Bank of Communications and several 'other 
banks of the old regime continued to exist but with some 
modifications having been. made on their charact~ Jor obvi-
ous reasons . 
. The Chekiang Bank was established in 1908 as a .semi· 
government organization and was a provincial bank, its head 
\ 
office being located in the city. of Hangchow. After the 
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republican revolution, its name was changed to the Chekiang 
Bank of Republican China and in 1915 it was again changed 
to the Chekiang Local Industrial Bank. When the National 
Commercial Bank, Ltd. was established in 1906, one half of 
its shares were held by the Chekiang Railway Company 
(#liZJ:tJ'~J!lb:-EJ). In 1915, the company was nationalized; its 
shares were transferred elsewhere; and its head 'office was 
shifted from Hangchow to Shanghai. Its by-laws were revised 
in the same year. 
The Commercial Guarantee Bank of Chihli was reorgan-
iied into a commercial bank in 1920. The Commercial 
Bank of China, which once went so far as to employ an 
Englishman as its manager, soon came to change its attitude 
towards foreign bankers and replaced its foreign employees' 
by Chine~e. This was th~ new start of its commerci~l 
enterprise. A' sudden. increase. in the ,., number of newly 
j:!stablh,hed banks, was one o{-"t\le_chi~f:features" of . this 
"period:.: - ". • . _ . '.' ", . ' .. 
. . New banks~ontinuedfo increase like mushrooms after 
"'.:;..i. ,'- ". rain., There were 185 banks in 1928. This'reckless estab-
lishmentof newhanks'was made with the First World War. -!; . 
. as its backgrollnd. As a necessary result of the ,speculative 
motive for this reckless establishment· of banks, there were 
deadlock and suspension of banks, thereby showing their' 
general weakness. , 
3. ADVANCE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN CHIN A . 
The expansion made by financial capital in China placed 
banking in a superior position over industry, although there 
existed a close relationship between the two. The truth that 
banking is not something that transcends the age but that 
it changes with the development ot industry made no excep' 
/ tion in the case of China.· I.shall.presentlY explain how 
Chinese industry was retarded and ho~Chinese banks failed 
to make their proper development. , 
As a result, of the advance of foreign 'capital into China, 
- , 
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she came to adopt Western institutions and customs, as 
shown ,by' the introduction of progressive industrial enter-
prises. The 'Chinese ffnancial orian developed from the piao 
hao (~W1t) to the chien chwang (QjJl:) or the native·style bank 
and then to 'the foreign·stylebank, but ,its development was 
subject to definite limitations. The object of foreign capital 
in China' was to export foreign manufactures and exploit 
Chinese raw materials; demand was made on the Chinese 
market for the sale of commodities and investment of capital. 
Demand n'i'ade on China.Jor the consumption of foreign 
goods and the absorption of foreign investments was bound 
to stimulate the development of production in Chinese 
economy. And in this process, foreign investment already 
made were to become the transfer of Chinese goods into the. 
foreign side. Unless the .. circulation of these goods and 
capital be made smoothly,. the for.eign goods and capital 
would strengthen thetende~cy of change,fromthe advance 
of goods to the control ofcapita,l,from the normal track to 
the abnormal one. . " 
The expansion of the foreign Powers' trade with China 
had the effect of expanding the demand for China's commer-
cial capital as well as her financial organs. But their sphere 
of activities was largely limited to the process of circulation 
of commodities, and they were unable to give rise to any 
close relation with industry beyond the commercial boundary. 
When an advance nation makes penetration into a backward 
country with its vast amount of commodities and an enor· 
mous capital, it is usually accompanied by progressive forms 
inherent in capitalism.' However, when viewed from the 
side of commodities, the progression of such .an advanced 
nation will show unwillingness t? give any positive support 
to the rise of the domestic industry of the backward country. 
Also. viewed from. the side of capital, the former nation 
wO\llcrcheck the rising industries of the latter nation,and 
would impede' the sane expansion of her financial organs. 
The same tendency existing. between a home country and 
its colonies did exist in the case of China.' . 
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An observation of the concrete problems of <:;hinawould 
reveal that prior to the advance of foreign capital, there 
, existed such native financial institutions as the Shanhsi piao 
hao {ilj!Jl.j~'l!)O and the chien chwang ("til£) or the native-style 
banks which were 'feund both necessary and highly impor-
tant. After the advent of Western, capitalism, HIe piao hao 
with its strong local colour became -unable 'to meet the de-
mimd' of the new age and came to be replaced by the native-
style banks, which also failed to make territorial expansion 
,required by the new age, 'because they lacked the technique 
and management possessed by' the, modern financial organs_ 
Thus, the native-style banks also came to be- replaced, in 
turn, by the advent of the new' form of financial organ, 
namely; the foreign-styfe bank with its' v\lst capital" fine 
organization and universal network of communication. Thus" 
the foreign-style Chinese banks made their appearance. -_ At 
first,both the foreign style financial organs and the demands -
of the time, seemed to make a parallel advance, but their-
course of advance was extremely limited. . As has been 
stated, the advance· of 'foreign, ca'pital, in China had two 
objects, namely, the sale of forei~n goods and the exploitation 
of Chinese raw.materials: ,With the advance of their trade 
with, China; the Chinese financial organs as supplementary 
institutions came to make their development. ,This was be-
cause the Chinese financjal organs occupied an advflntageous 
position VIS a vis the foreign capital and were able to secure 
exorbitant profits by their business management. The aid 
given by foreign capital to the Chinese _ financial organs 
never went beyond that limit. Nor was such aid restricted' 
to the Chinese foreign-style banks; for similar aid ""as also 
given to the native-style banks. The dependence of these 
two sets' of Chiiiese banks on foreign capital increased in 
intensity as time passed, and thq lacked foundation of their 
own. - Thus, the banks created during this period of transi-
tion were either bubble organizations whose birth was due 
to the effects of the World War. or thrise which failed ,to' 
correspond 1:0 the basis of industrial development. It was 
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, .. ",. 
undeniable from the very inception that the Chinese banks 
were characterized" by weakness. ' 
Examination has been, made:into the possible causes of 
. the impedirnents to the development of the Chinese foreign' 
style banks, especially in connection with -the various factors 
bound up with the' advance .of foreign financial power in 
China, In the first place, the opportune circumstances for: 
the establishment of foreign·style banks were brought 'about 
by the advance of foreign capital in that country. This 
foreign advance should have been considered along the same 
line with the development of theCbinese exchange economy 
. :Ind the expansion of her' sphere of commer~ial credit. But-
China failed to emancipate herself from the yoke of a semi· 
, colony due to tlle advance of foreign capital and her native· 
. industry was in Jetters, making' its development impossible. 
Th~ foreign-style banks 'Were obliged. to make. a very slow: 
development, .as there were restrictions placed on its advance· 
ment. 
" Secondly,' while there w~re circumstance~ that demanded 
" the establishment. of' foreign'styICoanks; even before their 
establishment, there had already been preparations made by 
foreign capital in order to meet such demand. Furthermore, 
there WaS a field in which the native·style banks attempted -
to cope with the problems of the time and which had their _ 
tradition~l foundation for business activities. Thus, the area 
which the expansion of -commercial finance opened up for 
the sake of the development of the Chinese foreign-style 
banks was extremely limited. ~ 
It will be noted that foreign capital in China had its 
specia1. __ mission; to secure the Chinese market for foreign 
commodities as well' as foreign investments. Both the sale 
of commodities, and the gathering ,of raw materials were' 
carried on not in the form of, direct exchange, but by means 
ofa third factor. In the process of the movement of .foreign 
commodities into interior regions ana of' the outflow of 
, Chinese raw materials therefrom, the" mechanism of control 
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acted as .middlemen in' this process received the lion's share 
of profits. Therein lay the reason why the Chinese. partici· 
pating in such transactions were placed under the subjection 
of foreign capital. , 
. The penetration' of foreign power was strengthened by 
, , .-
the advance of foreign capital such as investments in railways, -
navigation, industrial enterprises as well as in import and 
export trade activities. All this stimulated the market rela-
tions between the investing and invested countries. Enor-
mous foreign capital greatly expanded the importation of' 
foreign goods' into China by means of the comprador, the-
third factor, and monopolized the purchase of Chinese raw; 
materials. . All this formed a chain of relations with other 
factors such as the price manipulation in purchasing farm 
products, a great blow on the bye-industries of the farmers, 
and a heavy preSS1!re on the agricultural handicraft industry. 
It is said that the process~ of development' for commercial 
·.capital iil.the handicraft industryusually passesjwo stages, 
namely, exchang~' control and production control. With th~ 
. ~ .... ., . 
expansion of. market and. the development of production as 
, ".- .',' '\ _' '_" -, 1\ ' , 
>;. '" th~ .. bases, the· whole control . process of .. the . handicraft 
,industry by commercial capital is attained. Thus, commer-
cial capital turns into industrial 'capital and attains the stage 
. of industrial development. In the' transition from handicraft 
production to industrial production, in backward nations as 
well as in advanced nations, some· sacrifice is paid ~Iike. 
The sacrifice.in the case of China was much' greater than 
that of the advanced countries. . Tr,ue, Chinese production 
itself was. faced by depression but the process of selection 
I 
for the Chinese handicraft industry was keenerth\l~ in the 
case of other countries,' because it took place under the 
control of foreign nations. Capitalism in adval1ced countries 
dissolved native conditions as its historical mission in each. 
of them, but its process in China wrought just the opposite '., 
result~ Foreign '. capital obViously played .. no such role in 
China. Although the advance of foreign capital transplanted 
in China progressive economic forms and' abolished old and 
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obsolete methods and utilized the new processes and displayed 
modern efficitlncy; at the. same time, it utilized the native 
power as a convenient means in order to expand its activi-
ties. It often happens in history that the export' of .capital 
from a mother country. to its colonies had the effect. of 
- preventing the latter's progressive transformation." A similar 
phenomenon may be seen in the case of China, as the ad-' 
vance of foreign capital exercised the semi-colonial control 
on her, economic life. Although industrialization is the his-
torical mission of capitalism;.the advance of foreign capital 
failed to stimulate industrialization in the Chinese industry 
.which failed to make any' normal development. 
Although the' inroads of foreign capital into, China 
transplanted there modern productive means which are the 
progressive factors or forms of capitalism, the thorough-going 
control exercised by foreign 'capital from the exchange to 
production processes proved fetters on the development of 
the native industries in China. 
4. . THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN BANKS AND THE 
FORMA TION OF' THE COMPRADOR 
The main characteristic of· the organization of foreign 
banks may be also taken up from a similar viewpoint. Al-
though foreign investments were not made with the banks 
of foreign nationalities as their principal object and they 
extended over the entire branches of industry,. these banks, 
of course, were the central mechanism of control by foreign 
financiers in China.' his often pointed out that the foreign 
banks exercised their ·sway in China in the early period as 
a kind of colonial banks;. that their business management 
had extended over the passive as wen as active enterprises, 
from the absorption of capital to its operation; and that 
both in result and function the foreign banks impeded the 
normal development of the Chinese foreign·style banks. The 
above statement is made by the critics because they believe' 
that fDreigninvestments such as various political loans and 
, ., \ 
, ' 
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economic consortiums and others were made by means of 
those powerful foreign banks, with the unilateral treaties as 
their background. For the advance of foreign influence or 
capital in China, it was necessary to utilize Chinese as their 
instrume(lts. Thus, foreign firms or banks had to utilize 
capable Chinese merchants as their assistants. , On their 
participation depended the development of foreign firms or 
banks, while the Chinese received fixed salaries and allow· 
ances for the execution of their services. Thus, there came 
into being the system of compadors. 
That China lacked capital and had to import foreign 
funds for her economic development was recognized by both 
foreigners and the Chinese, themselves. But whereas the 
foreigners wished to supply capital to the Chinese at the 
expense, of China's subjection to the former, the Chinese 
wished'to secure foreign capital and to maintain their inde-
pendence at the same time-., Thus,both were opposed to 
~ ,each othevin "'policIes.' If the intention ,of foreigners was to 
strengthen the controlfing mechanism by means of their 
investments, the demand of the' Chinese was that their finan-
cial'distress 'be relieved ,on the 'basis of int-ernational co-op-
,eration.: If such co-operation was impossible of realization, 
the Chinese at least wished to receive foreign capital purely 
as commercial investment. made by foreign countries orin-
dividuals.' But· the intention of ~he foreigners in their 
investments Was to 'expand their control over China from, 
the exchange to production 'process, while the' Chinese desire 
consisted in checking the baneful influence of foreign capital 
by limiting its activities' to a . purely commerCial nature; 
Thus, the former's advance for dominion was utterly opposed 
to the latter's policy of self-preservation and self-help. ' True, 
'there. was some measure of 'compromise between these two' 
'sets of attitudes, but no sign of realization could be seen, 
,mainly because Of the profound misunderstanding on the 
part of 'the Chinese., ' " 
The advance of foreign capital was madEn::hiefly through 




complicated bOth in content and funCtion: But'their relations 
with the Chinese banks may be summarized as follows: 
from the ve'ry inception the Chinese banks continued their 
one,sided relations with the foreign banks, the latter holding 
the~eins and the former being subjected to their qppressive "-
measures. " 
As the financial organs of the, Chinese lacked the basis 
of industrial production, they could not escape from the 
, . 
oppression of the superior foreign banks, evelY though the 
former maintained their comll!ercial foundation.' The Chinese 
banks were forced to render service to the foreign banks 
and ~ere required to occupy the position of the compradors. 
In other words, the foreign banks and the Chinese banks 
were in the relations of 'uiaster and servant; the latterJlad 
-. to make their development merely as commercial banks. 
The Chinese foreign-sty Ie banks, too, had to exist as' a kind 
of the compractor. However, it is only a half·truth 'that . 
these external factois. are solely responsible for the malformed 
transition in which the Chinese banks were placed in the 
course.of their development. 'We should, indeed, go deeper. 
into a wider scope of tile problem under consideration. 
It is often pointed out that theinroads of foreign capital 
into ,China resulted in the extension. of its control over the 
Chinese native industries from their exchange process to 
production pr'ocess, the~eby preventing their sane develop-
ment. An examination of the distribution of foreign capital 
reveals that ,its control over Chinese production proved 
checks thereon, a very negligible portion of investments 
being made in industrial enterprises. Moreover, industrial 
investments were limited to a very small number of indus-
tries such as the agricultural mineral industry; communica-
tion, banking and several light industries. Almost no foreign, 
investments . were 'made in heavy industries, so that Chini!' 
. has a yery small number of steel, fuel and machinery enter-
prises. 
The greatest portion of foreign capital consisted in non-
productive investments. In extreme cases, foreign invest-
,-,' . 
.. 
THE' CHINESE BANKS IN MALFORMED 1'RANSITION 63 
ments were made for the sheer purpose of destroying pro· 
duction. The object of the foreign Powers in making such 
investments was to adjust· China to their own demands, the 
upshot of all this being that she had to remain for a long 
period of time a sort of dependency for industrial nations. 
Thus, China could not emerge from her medieval economic 
stage and was constrained to remain in a semi·civilized , 
condition. It is to be admitted that large·scale industries 
or industries yielding large profits were largely controlled 
by foreign capital. rather than by Chinese capital. However, 
there remains the question as to whether Chinese economy, 
on which the mechanism of. control was enforced by' foreign 
capital; was so impotent that it could not defend· itself against 
foreign influence or digest it for its own benefit. 1 believe 
it is. nec~ssaryto elucidate the internal circumstances _ of 
China which transformed her status from a semi.colony into 
a full·fledged colony, insteaddf . discarding, " as she should 
. have done, her status of asemi·colony .. 
",. ,"' , ~,.. " 
, '··5.: REMNANTS-OF NATIVE ECONOMY 
" 
. .• When' Chi~ese economy. made its debut as a ring of the 
'chain of world economy, China had to develop itself as a . 
semi·colony, under' the sway of foreign capital which had 
placed her under its control. _ Only those Chinese elements 
which allied themselves with the foreign Powers could exist· 
and develpp themselves both politically and economically 
and hold the position of control in her domestic life, The 
old style production of China began to decline, from the middle 
of the 19th century but the remnants of the native power 
persisted in remaining .. As a result of this,- Chinese economy 
became neither capitalist economy nor feudal economY,but 
a malformed composite economy under the capitalistic econo· 
my of the foreign Powers. It has been .pointed out by 
students of Chinese economic problems that Chinese. e~onomy 
\. , " .. 
is composed' of. three factors, namely, feudal heritage, capi· 
talism and' international capitalism, all of which' combined 
--
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gave rise to a speCial evolutionary process in China. Some 
- scholars attach greater importance to native factor than to 
the other tWO factors. Others point to the - differences be-
tween the nature of the Chinese -feudal system and that of 
the Westem feudal system. Still other uphold that Chinese 
econOJ:ny has already attained the stage of capitalism. AI-' 
though scholars thus differ in views regarding the nature 
of Chinese economy, 'th's much is -clear that it cannot be 
grasped by means of single conceptions, and that there are. 
three factors or forces which together form a complicated 
paradox.· -
The native remnants, the advance of foreign' capitalistic 
power and the rise of the native capitalistic power are three 
forces which are contradictory to one another. These forces 
have so pervaded every branch irr-ithe entire economic and 
social mechanism' in China that they· have produced a mal-
formed condition in the whole economic society. - Nor do 
financial circ1esmake any except'ion. These forces naturally. 
are unequal in their strength~ As may be expected, the 
foreign power occupied the uppermost position_ThepoIitical 
mechanism came into the .ascendancy only when the native 
force was wedded to the foreign forc~ either directly or 
indirectly, in addition to its alliance with the native capital-
isticforce. A 'simila.r tendency was seen also on the pa.rt 
of financial circles. As has been stated in comiection with 
the semi-colonial nature of China, the Chinese banks lacked 
ground for industrial development; and those commercial 
capitalists, who participated in the management of the banks 
with whicJ1 they made an alliance, were negligible in power 
and influence. .The bulk of Chine.se capitalinvestt<d· in the 
banking business came from the military leaders, government 
officials and landlords. The military leaders and government 
officials, in particular, occupied the contiolling position in 
the' management of banks. Thus, the Chinese foreign-style 
banks seemed to represent the' rising native capitalists, but 
in reality they were dependent on foreign power. On the 
other hand, native capital itself was a transformation of the 
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power of military clique and officiiil bureaucracy, and' was 
unable to develop because of its penetration by foreign 
capital externally and by native power internaIly. It was 
natural .that the so·called capitalist class in China faileg to 
possess th-e absolute ruling power. , 
If . the advance of foreign capital had the effect of im-
peding the industrial growth of China, hereconomic develop-
ment was inevitably restricted because, it was based on in, 
dustrial development, The Chinese foreign-style banks also 
were prevented from making their development under foreign 
influence. These banks could not fun<;tion 'as either agricul-
tural or industrial banks, and their, road of. advance was 
restricted within the category of commercial finance_ 
Because of the limited sphere for industrial expansion, 
investments by the military leaders,-government officials ,and 
landlords were)nJandsandbimks( Even those foreign-style 
'. ',"--:' -, _., -'-", ,-'-'" -" -,- "" ' 
" banKs whIch belonged. t6 the native financiers failed .to de-
~;i:i;,;.,,;·;:·.Y~i6p\iridtistr1al enterprises, as their function was' strictly 
.''','9l''~"~''''''',-,~-",'''/'"'''' -"-.-'~ .,:- ,-', ","',- ',';. --",' ,-'!,,,." _"",,, ~~~t'~i;dX'C\;.'citdimscribed;· The military leaders and government officials 
"~~<,<s,,,,,: .. ~;.,,,,:-:,,:,,,;,,,~,-,-,:.,,:\,,·;,,,-·,·!,) - _,,''v "-, _ _ . F"",,::;, ,;1~'~ ,noCon!y became shareholders of the banks in which they 
,;:, ",. 'invested their capital, but also' established their own banks, 
,bothforeign·style and. native-style. 
Some of these military leaders and government ·officials 
had their banks established in single provinces or in several 
of them, and tried to protect their owri economic interests; 
Thus, there were provincial or municipal banks by which 
these leaders and officials exploited the people with the aid of 
paper money in addition to the exploitation by means of vari- I 
ous taxes. The remnants of the native system in the field of 
finance usually res~lt in the decline of the system itself when 
the financial system is expanded territorially .. As the matter 
,actually stood in the case of China, these native remnjints 
had the effect of abusing the issue system of the provincial 
_, and municipal banks.,' Moreover;-profit-making bound up in 
the issuance of paper money was the main cause of the 
reckless establishment'of banks urid~r the native influence.' 
, . 
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6, tHE FIJ;:LD OF NATIVE-STYLE BANKS AND -
THEIR CONNECTION WITH FOREIGN-
STYLE BANKS 
.- When Chinese foreign-style banks were established, they 
had to-prot~ct themselves against two hostile factors, namely, 
the foreign banks _ which had alreadY begun their activities 
in commercial financial-the field in whiCh the Chinese 
foreign-style banks were to make advance-and the native-
style Chinese banks which had already established their 
·traditjonal foundation_ We have already seen that the foreign 
banks were allied with the native force and that the so-called 
financial capital of the fordgn-styleChinese banks had an 
extension of for:eign power in China and represented the 
native remnants_ Now, it will be noted that the native-style 
banks are representatives of commercial Capital but essen-
tially -they are a financial powe~ of the _ native remnants_ 
We have seen the external obstacles to the deyelopment 
·of foreign'style Chinese banks, but there were domestic 
factors which also. tended to impede the 'Sane development 
of these banks. Due to their initial circumstances; the 
_ foreign-style Chinese banks could not free themselves fro~ -
tbecontrol of foreign . capital. but they also had to overcome 
tbe otlP<x>itionof tbe native-style banks. 
If the native-style banks were clothed in native remnants, 
as they actW:llly were, the foreign-style banks should have 
_ been the financial orga,n which represented the rising native 
capitalist class. One may roughly say that the foreign-style 
banks held their development in servitude to foreign power, 
wbile the naHve-style banks continued their existence as the 
puppet of local force, _ There was this common point between 
them. that both acted as the compraclor for the foreign 
PQWer, and made their development by acting as the hand of 
-the n,ative power. Just as the natiVe power and the foreign 
power CQuid not' exist as separate beings, so the nCitive-stYle 
banks could not disregard the _ native PQwer, and for that 
matter, the foreign capital. Nor were the foreign· style banks 
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'divorced from native 'remnants. 
7. PERSONAL CONSOLIDATION AND 
TERRITORIAl TIES 
. One notable 'characteristic' in Chinese economic life. Is' 
that capitalistic elemehtsor forms 'adopted froin Western 
countries and 'the native elements,ot forms within ,Chinese 
life did not tun in opposite direction Out that there were· 
phases inwhichl:he two showed inter·relations. - AlthOugh 
in actuality, the influence 'of the capitalistienations was 
transplanted in China, China should ba~e adopted capitalistic 
elements or' torms, and should' have i:liscarded het natiVe 
relmiants, If she hoped to make modern ecotldmic 'develop-
hlehl:. ' ','. ' . 
. We h1iveseen that the colirse 'Of advan'ce for the foreign-
sltleChinese "bartkS had been n'iitfowei:l by the control of 
,,·-the fureigh)Jowerahtaby 1:berestraints of the native foice, 
.-2aMth~t'1~Y )h'ade their development in the field of com-
" .. ~~,\. ','- - - - . 
····-~~iar tifiafice .. ' En .' course ,there was. art6therset of 
· ... -," - ',." , -' . . -' - - . - '---. , 
, ",'f'oreigh-'sty-le'Cbin'ese banks,whiCh were ~tab1ished by the 
Chit't~se 'C1!pitalls'tswithOtitahY . reference to tb'e above forces, 
but' they were negligible in importance, bothpo!itkal allo 
· econ'omic. 'Oil the otlier hand, the foreign-style Chinese 
bankS whieh were allied with the internal aridextemal fdfC~s 
aboVe noted, possessed strong org-anizationeven though their 
cootse of advance' was limited. Their brief explanation, . 
therefore, is necessary. 
The course of advance for foreign-style Chinese banks 
was menaced, oil one hand, by the pOwerfun~'xisterlte of 
foreign banks and the tradition'alnatlve,style banks, un the 
other. However, these two factotsproved a stimUlant for 
· the deve!.op'ment of foreign-style banks,at the sanre tirti\'~. 
AI! the Chil'le-sebanks whether fon;i~n·style utftatiVe:style 
w~re subservient to the banks, of' f()teim'1 natiooalltie's f~t 
which they acted as the eomptatloi'S. NO'w, the native-stYle 
banlts W'et<e ill a position to sUpplyexi)erreftl:e ahd rechitique 
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to the foreign-style banks, as the former had along experi-
ence, and gave actual assistance in some cases." A notable ' 
example along this line is offered, by Mr. Hsieh .Lun-hui 
(i!!K1fij'Jll!) the first manager of the Commercial Bank of China, 
was formerly the manager of a native-style bank. in Shanghai' 
'named Cheng Yii (**~~:E). This personal consolidation 
between the native-banks and the foreign-style banks forms 
a relation in which some powerful shareholders or managers 
of native-style banks assumed the managership or director-
ship of some foreign-style banks. A similar personal consoli-
'dation existed al~o between the native-style banks and the, 
banks of foreign nationalities. For instance" the influential 
shareholders or managers of' native-style banks often acted 
as the compradors for some banks of foreign nationalities. 
While the personal consolidation between the banks of 
foreign nationalities and the natiVe-style -Chinese banks'was 
made ,at the subservience of the latter" that'-between the 
foreign-style banks and the native-stYle banks was made at 
the leadership of the latter, at least in the beginning. All 
this' was _ a natural outcome of the co-existence of foreign 
capital, native influence and the rising Chinese capital, a,nd 
those banks which did not harmonize with these various 
forces natural selection_ 
It may be regarded as natural that this personal consoli-
dation between the native-style banks and the foreign-style 
banks shifted from the .former's policy of assisting the .latter 
to their mutual benefit. The personal relations between these 
two sets of banks was further consolidated by territorial ties. 
Such pers'onal consolidation and territorial ties were 
designed to assure self-protection and persons concerned 
showed willingness to co-operate. This is why both the 
native-style and foreign-style banks embodied the native 
remnants of which they were a continuation or extension. 
, 
In the recent catastrophe of the native-style banks, although 
many of them faced bankruptcy, much of the shares of these 
banks was transferred to foreign'style banks. 
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Chinese financial circ\es,one cannot regard them as a rising 
power in China. On' the contrary, one may perceive the 
territorial influence running over their background. A con-
crete example of this may be found in the fact that impor-
tant banks in Shanghai are controlled by the financiers· of 
the two provinces of Chekiang and KiangsJ. The foreign-
style Chinese banks. which lacked the basis of industrial 
development allied themselves with the banks of foreign 
nationalities and the surviving native systems. Another 
notable fact is that the majority of the foreign-style Chinese 
banks arose in coastal. provinces under the industrial and 
financial restrictions. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In their' external relations, the Chinese banks made a 
. subservient development- in that they were utiliied by the 
. b.anksof foreign nationalities, receiving excessive profits for 
the execution of their services." In their internal relations, 
these same banks also made a subservient development in 
that their activities centered around local and central finan-
cial crises. Generally speaking; their activities consisted in 
the use of money' at exorbitant interest rates and tbey failed 
to exploit the, teiritory of normal banking development 
Only those who had'special reasons for existence managed 
to survive. ' 
